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 Hong Kong Unrest and Implications for the Hang Seng Index 
Authors: Lucía Morales & Bernadette Andreosso-O’Callaghan 
 
Abstract 
With the September 2014 ‘Umbrella Revolution’ in Hong Kong, China faced one of the 
biggest political challenges since the Tiananmen Square events. Beijing’s proposed 
electoral reform was perceived as a direct attack to democracy, and the ensuing protest 
triggered concerns amid local and international investors; the financial sector took the 
hardest hit, with stocks of companies exposed to the Hong Kong market facing 
significant losses. Volatility continued to increase to a seven-month high over worries 
that the student blockade in Hong Kong’s streets could drag on for longer than 
expected. The econometric-based analysis in this paper looks at the implications of the 
protest and its spillover effect on the Hang Seng Index with a focus on sectoral 
performance. The ultimate objective is to gain a better understanding of the impact of 
the protests on different stocks and sectors with the goal of identifying market 
vulnerability and potential volatility patterns. 
Keywords: Hong Kong Political Unrest, Hang Seng Index, Volatility, Spillover Effects 
and Growth. 
JEL: F30, F65 and G15 
 
1. Introduction 
Hong Kong’s recent political unrest or ‘Umbrella Revolution’ began in September 2014 
with activists occupying the city’s major intersections to demonstrate their disapproval 
of the decision made by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) 
of the People’s Republic of China aimed at disallowing civil nominations and to limit 
public choices for the upcoming election. This unrest has been challenging regional 
and world financial markets due to fears of a potential escalation undermining 
ultimately Beijing’s position.  
Analysts and investors worried about the measures that could be taken by China’s 
central government in attempting to control and neutralize the protests and about the 
direct implications these measures could have for financial stability in Hong Kong and 
further afield. The situation generated an increasing level of both uncertainty and 
ambiguity among investors, adding to the general economic uncertainty dominating 
the financial markets, to a weakened Euro-area and to the slowdown of China’s 
economic growth. As a result, investors’ uneasiness and anxiety could evolve into 
strategic decisions that could generate negative spillover effects affecting global 
economic growth and stability. In the specific case analysed here, investors could draw 
substantial amounts of capital from Hong Kong and reallocate them to more politically 
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stable countries and regions. This is because Hong Kong is considered as being a major 
economic player in the region, given it being the main gateway for trade into China’s 
mainland, as well as having a key position as a banking hub for Chinese banks and 
companies that seek offshore funding. Hong Kong’s role as a financial centre is critical 
to Chinese companies, even though this privileged position is under threat as China is 
adamant to develop other stock exchanges such as Shanghai (see for example 
Karreman and van der Knaap, 2009; Lai, 2012). 
It is because of Hong Kong’s current crucial role as a financial centre within China and 
further afield, that the impact of political events such as the Hong Kong ‘Umbrella 
Revolution’ ought to be analysed. Consequently, the objective of this study is to look 
into the Hong Kong stock market and its reaction to the 2014 political unrest. Stock 
markets are chosen as the focus of our analysis since they are a fundamental element 
of an economy. They have a vital role in mirroring the economic performance of key 
industrial sectors of the economy and of serving as a barometer of economic growth. 
Basic details of the Hang Seng Index behaviour during the 2014 protests in Hong Kong 
will be offered; furthermore, the way the different sectors reacted to the event, the way 
market dynamics operated, and the connections that exist between stock markets 
performance and political unrest will all be analysed here. 
The ensuing section (Section 2) will present some background information on the 
China-Hong Kong relationship since 1997 as well as on stock markets’ behaviour 
during times of unrest in the relevant literature. Section 3 will describe the 
methodology and data used, whereas section 4 will provide an analysis of the results. 
Some final remarks will be suggested in the concluding section.  
 
2. The China-Hong Kong relationship and Stock Markets’ Behaviour 
during times of Unrest 
2.1. The China-Hong Kong relationship 
Since the territory reverted from British to Chinese control in 1997, issues regarding 
Beijing’s compliance with agreed policies have been a continuous source of discontent 
among Hong Kong citizens. This discontent became a reality when Beijing announced 
in September 2014 that it would vet candidates to run in the 2017 elections. Protesters 
perceived this decision as an attempt to regulate and intervene in the territory’s 
democratic process.  
This decision was taken in the background of serious corruption scandals affecting 
Chinese government officials and tarnishing Hong Kong’s position in the region; as a 
result, tourism and retails sales dropped during the first two quarters of 2014 and 
growth rates slowed down. The September 2014 disruptions affected in a significant 
manner the holiday sales period (1st and 2nd of October). Consequently, weak results in 
the retail sector translated into a negative behaviour of their stocks on the Asian stock 
markets. At the peak of the protests, the Hang Seng Index experienced a significant 
volatility behaviour coupled with a downward trend affecting its performance since the 
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early days in September (Figure 1). The students’ protests towards the end of the month 
contributed to heighten the Hang Seng decline, and the index eventually dropped by 
1,073 points since the beginning of the month representing a decline of 4.34% from its 
peak. On the 26th of September, as the protests escalated with students marching 
towards government buildings, the Hang Seng suffered a sharp decline that brought 
the index below the 23,000 mark. An additional 2.59% drop was registered over the 
subsequent two days of trading, before the stock market was closed for the two-day 
holiday period at the beginning of October, when a flat rate was registered. Once the 
market opened again, on the 3rd of October, the index raised in the hope that a deal to 
appease the protesters was at reach. From this day onwards, the market registered a 
positive trend with small recoveries around 1% on a daily basis, a recovery that was 
truncated on the 10th of October by the release of negative news based on a pessimistic 
global outlook. Afterwards, the Hang Seng index just consolidated its downward trend 
and started to move towards the 22,500 mark, as reflected in figure 1. On the 15th of 
December, police forces cleared up all protesters’ camps at Causeway Bay putting an 
end to the movement. On the 17th of December, the Hang Seng started to climb back 
and by the end of January 2015, the index was quite close to regaining the 25,000 mark 
that had been lost back in September 2014 when the students’ protests had started. 
During 2015, the index remained quite strong moving above the 28,000 mark by the 
28th of April. Afterwards, the index started to be quite unstable and moved below the 
21,000 mark as per the latest records in the early days of January 2016. 
Figure 1: Hang Seng Index Performance during the Umbrella Protests 
 
Source: Financial Times (October 7, 2014) 
 
2.2. Stock markets’ behaviour during times of unrest 
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The geographical location of Hong Kong has determined its political and economic 
history since the territory has been all along a natural geographic port for Guangdong 
province in Southeast China. Since its origins, Hong Kong has been closely linked to 
China through trade, allowing the region to connect with global markets. The territory 
underwent a rapid and successful process of industrialization from the 1950s and it has 
become one of the world’s major international financial centres. Between 1978 and 
1997, Hong Kong enjoyed sustainable growth, and it became the main provider of 
commercial and financial services in the region. The connection between Hong Kong 
and the People’s Republic of China grew in a bidirectional way, as Hong Kong’s firms 
started to move their operations to China’s mainland economy so as to benefit from 
cheap labour and from other (fiscal) advantages. From 1997 onwards, - after its 
retrocession to the People’s Republic of China -, main connections were developed in 
the tourism, financial and retail trade sectors. At that time, the Asian region was 
surrounded by intense uncertainty as the Asian Financial Crisis was unfolding, pushing 
Hong Kong into an economic recession mirrored by increased unemployment rates 
and by substantial declines in both output and prices. However, the relatively strong 
position of the Chinese economy led to an increase in trade and investment between 
Hong Kong and China, linking further their combined economic prospects. 
2.2.2. Spillover Effects arising from Political Unrest 
Stock markets performance is closely connected with the evolution of the global and 
local economy due to monetary and fiscal linkages. The existing literature has 
considered stock markets’ reactions before and after elections, and the main findings 
seem to suggest that markets react differently based on the party of the president being 
elected (Rahaman et al., 2013) and on the overall political position. As noted by Beyer 
et al. (2011) political gridlock and government instability have an impact on the type 
of monetary and fiscal policies implemented in a given country that end up affecting 
securities performance. Saad (2011, p.2) defines political instability as a situation 
where a country’s political system is subjected to tensions that generate ‘non-
convenience scenarios’ that ultimately undermine the economic stability in the country 
experiencing the situation of unrest. Political instability affects a country’s risk 
premium and it encourages international investors to reassess their investment 
decisions and to be cautious regarding their risk exposure and their strategic allocation 
of capital. Initial political unrest can derive into a severe political crisis that could 
trigger military coups and general political violence that will end up eroding the 
economic development of a country. It follows that political instability represents 
potentially a major danger to an economy. 
Political events and their impact on financial markets volatility have been analysed by 
Khalid and Rajaguru (2010). They find that domestic and international events have a 
short-run linkage to both the economy and to its financial markets. This relationship 
is enhanced by the level of integration shared between the domestic and global 
economies. The more integrated the goods, services and financial markets with the 
world economy, the bigger their exposure to macroeconomic shocks that lead to 
increased levels of stocks volatility. Political instability affects financial markets 
performance, and it eventually impacts upon the performance of the real economy 
thereby undermining its growth. 
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In the case of emerging markets such as those under investigation here, significant 
connections between political uncertainty and financial crises were found by Mei and 
Guo (2004). Markets volatility increased during times of political election and during 
transition periods, indicating that political uncertainty might be a contributing factor 
to financial crises with enhanced effects on emerging markets. An initial issue to 
consider is the impact that political uncertainty has on foreign direct investment. A 
climate dominated by a lack of both government stability and clarity with regard to 
policies would either deter investment or generate significant delays in investment that 
would end up being diverted to regions that offer more stability to investors. Another 
pertinent macroeconomic variable to analyse is the country’s exchange rate: an 
unstable country would be more than likely affected by depreciation exacerbating 
investors’ worries and making them more pessimistic regarding the overall investment 
environment. In this regard, the higher the political uncertainty, the more it would pay 
to investors to delay their investment decisions, and as a result the market demand for 
the local currency would diminish. Under this scenario, if the country’s position 
weakens enough, the situation could leave way to potential speculative attacks that 
could spread to the real economy prompting a situation that undermines the country’s 
international credibility. In addition, it has been reported that high levels of political 
corruption might also affect the country’s economic efficiency, but these do not seem 
to be a major force that leads towards a serious crisis (Mei and Guo, 2004). 
Kim and Mei (2001) identified jump return dates associated with political events 
through the analysis of volatility behaviour linked to political announcements. Their 
findings indicate that political developments in Hong Kong have a significant impact 
on both its stock market volatility and returns. The main reason behind this type of 
behaviour can be found in the government’s decisions regarding fiscal and monetary 
policies that are heavily influenced by a change of government that has a direct impact 
on markets’ behaviour and performance. The authors also found that the impact of 
news linked to political events is asymmetric with bad news having a greater volatility 
effect than good news. In addition, returns experienced the largest variations when 
major political news were released. 
Roe and Siegel (2011) argue that political instability strongly affects overall economic 
developments. What they suggest is that political unrest is a vehicle of instability that 
ultimately causes major disruptions in the economic and financial development of a 
country. The authors conclude that political instability strongly impedes economic 
development and that financial development is found to be closely linked with 
economic development. Consequently, a primary channel from political stability 
towards economic development could well run from a sound financial system that will 
generate positive spillover effects to the rest of the economy. Analysing political 
instability and its impact on the financial system is therefore fundamental as this helps 
understand and explain the main differences between countries’ levels of economic and 
financial development.  
The existing research concludes that institutional investors should take into account 
markets behaviour during times of political unrest in order to design and diversify their 
investment portfolios and optimise their risk management strategies. These initial 
findings lead us to argue that the Hong Kong index and its sectoral performance would 
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be negatively affected as a result of the Umbrella protests and that investors will be 
looking at their portfolios to ensure that they are able to minimise their risk exposure 
to this market. In our next section, we offer some details of our selected research 
sample and methodology that help us illustrate how the Hong Kong protests did indeed 
impact upon the Hang Seng index and its related industrial sectors. 
3. Research Framework 
 
3.2. Research Sample 
Our research sample spans from December 2011 to December 2014 with a focus on the 
weeks during which the Hong Kong protests took place (i.e. between the 25th of 
September to the 10th of October 2014). The selected sample allowed us to develop a 
volatility framework based on the estimation of a GARCH(1, 1) model. We gathered 
daily data from Thomson’s Reuters DataStream for the selected period to ensure that 
an optimal number of observations was available so as to minimise problems with the 
GARCH estimation that requires a minimum of 500 observations. A total of 785 
observations were thus collected rendering the sample appropriate to proceed with the 
implementation of the selected volatility framework. In addition, we split the sample 
into a micro-period that considered the time-frame of the protests and that allowed us 
outline the behaviour of the Hang Seng Index and its sectors at the time when the 
protests were at their peak level (25th Sept. to 11th Oct. 2014). 
3.3. Research Methodology 
Our research methodology is supported by the analysis of basic descriptive statistics 
for the Hang Seng Index and its connected industrial sectors that help us to provide a 
straightforward discussion of market performance over a three-year period and during 
the weeks when the social unrest in Hong was at its highest level. In addition, we 
developed a traditional and basic volatility framework to model volatility patterns over 
the three-year period.  
The analysis started with basic econometric testing to ensure that our series comply 
with stationarity properties, with the use of the Augmented Dickey Fuller and the 
Phillips-Perron tests. We also developed an appropriate Vector Autoregressive 
Framework to ensure that the optimal number of lags where identified. We continued 
with the identification of ARCH effects on our series that confirmed the existence of 
heteroskedastic behavior. Finally, the volatility model selected for our analysis was the 
well-known and generally accepted approach for testing volatility, the Generalised 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model introduced by 
Bollerslev (1986), with the basic GARCH(1, 1) being implemented. Bollerslev’s  
generalised ARCH model, that is GARCH (p, q), is outlined below: 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽
′𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡        (1)
  
where 𝜀𝑡|𝛺𝑡 ~ iid N(0, ℎ𝑡) 
 
ℎ𝑡 =  𝜔 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖ℎ𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝜀𝑡−𝑗
2𝑞
𝑗=1       (2) 
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This states that the value of the variance scaling parameter ℎ𝑡 depends on both past 
values of the shocks, which are captured by the lagged squared residual terms, and on 
the past values of itself, which are captured by lagged ℎ𝑡 terms. The simplest form of 
the GARCH (p, q) model is the GARCH (1, 1) that was considered an optimal approach 
to support this study. The variance equation is defined below as: 
ℎ𝑡 =  𝜔 + 𝛼1ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝜀𝑡−1
2                                                       (3) 
where 𝜔 denotes the long run variance, α is the coefficient of the difference between 
today’s variance and previous periods’ values, and β is the coefficient between today’s 
variance and previous time periods’ variance. In other words, 𝜔 denotes the long run 
volatility, whereas the α coefficient measures volatility pikes, and the β coefficient looks 
after volatility persistence effects. 
4. Empirical Findings 
We selected two main descriptors to identify Hong Kong’s stock performance over a 
three-year period (Table 1). On average, only the energy and materials sector showed 
negative returns, while the Hang Seng index and returns for the remaining sectors 
registered positive values. In terms of uncertainty, we found that the information 
technology sector, industries, energy and the services sector were the ones subject to 
major variations, while the rest of the sectors were sticking to the Hang Seng Index 
performance.  
Our findings connect with the views put forward by Kim and Mei (2001) who found a 
close relationship between political risk in Hong Kong and market volatility. Our initial 
findings illustrate how political developments in Hong Kong are having a significant 
impact on market volatility and stock returns, and how certain sectors of the economy 
seem to be more affected than others. The situation is clearly reflected by pronounced 
losses faced during the weeks of the protests with the services sector -  especially those 
activities connected to tourism such as retail trade - having been greatly impacted upon 
during the holiday period. 
Table 1: –Hang Seng Stock Market Returns (mean and standard deviation) 
Time Period 
December 2011 - December 2014 (783 
observations) 
  
Index Mean SD 
Hang Seng 0.028 0.94 
Sectors Mean SD 
Conglomerates 0.039 0.97 
Consumer Goods 0.0058 0.94 
Energy 
-
0.034 
1.25 
Financial 0.034 1.04 
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Industries 0.011 1.33 
Information Technology 0.111 1.45 
Materials 
-
0.027 
1.29 
Property and Constructions 0.031 1.15 
Services 0.02 1.28 
Telecommunications 0.013 1.12 
Utilities 0.019 0.74 
Table 2: Hang Seng and Sector Price Changes (Sep 25 to Oct 10 2014) 
Date Sep 25 Sep 26 Sep 29 Sep 30 Oct 1* Oct 2* Oct 3 Oct 6 Oct 7 Oct 8 Oct 9 Oct 10 
Index 
Hang Seng -0.64% -0.38% -1.90% -1.28% 0.00% 0.00% 0.57% 1.09% 0.46% -0.68% 1.17% -1.90% 
Sectors 
Energy -0.70% -1.03% -1.80% -1.28% 0.00% 0.00% -0.56% 0.78% 0.80% -1.31% 0.48% -2.51% 
Materials -0.06% -0.38% -1.45% -1.74% 0.00% 0.00% -0.30% 2.11% 0.58% -0.57% -1.13% -1.05% 
Industrial 0.22% -0.78% -1.15% -1.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.19% 1.76% 0.78% -0.43% 0.75% -1.82% 
Consumer Goods 0.28% -0.72% -2.13% -0.21% 0.00% 0.00% -0.06% 0.97% 0.68% -0.56% 1.24% -1.12% 
Telecoms -1.07% -1.07% -0.59% -2.80% 0.00% 0.00% 2.70% -0.96% 0.88% -1.00% 2.80% -2.57% 
Utilities -0.67% 0.45% -2.03% -1.19% 0.00% 0.00% 0.68% 0.69% 0.99% -0.72% 1.90% -1.47% 
Financial -0.77% -0.18% -1.80% -1.15% 0.00% 0.00% 0.40% 0.66% 0.36% -0.27% 1.14% -1.80% 
Property -0.02% -0.50% -3.38% -1.37% 0.00% 0.00% 0.94% 2.08% 0.45% -0.97% 1.35% -1.40% 
Construction -0.18% -0.70% -2.66% -1.32% 0.00% 0.00% 1.50% 1.49% 0.13% -0.78% 1.07% -1.30% 
Technology -0.24% -1.01% -1.02% -0.30% 0.00% 0.00% 0.22% 2.72% 0.19% -0.86% -0.58% -2.02% 
Conglomerates -0.38% -0.34% -2.40% -1.26% 0.00% 0.00% 0.90% 2.20% 0.31% -0.32% 0.51% -1.41% 
Services -1.86% 1.79% -2.16% -1.65% 0.00% 0.00% 0.04% 3.76% 0.49% -1.51% 0.81% -1.23% 
*Flat – Market Closed for two days holidays (Source: DataStream) 
 
Table 2 and Figure 2 depict market and sectoral performance over the twelve critical 
days of the period. Our goal is to illustrate prices changes during the week when the 
Hong Kong protests were at their highest level. As can be seen from Table 2, the Hang 
Seng index experienced losses from September 25 to September 30, with the highest 
change recorded on the 29th of September when the protests where escalating, as 
students marched towards government buildings. The markets faced a respite due to 
their closure during the early October holiday period which was followed by some 
tranquillity (on the 3rd of October) as market tensions eased given the expectation that 
a deal was close. On the 10th of October, the market dropped again amidst a pessimistic 
outlook for the global economy. The sectoral analysis is in line with the trend exhibited 
by the Index, registering losses two days before the marches took place and showing 
sharp declines in every sector during the critical day of the 29th of September. The 
sectors that were most affected by the declines were: property, construction, 
conglomeratesi, retail trade, telecommunications and the financial sectors. Over the 
twelve days of protests, the telecommunications and financial sectors exhibited 
substantial swings. 
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Figure 2: Hang Seng Index and Sectoral Changes  
 
Source:  Authors’ own elaboration, 2015. 
Table 3: Hang Seng Index and Sectors Volatility 
Coefficients Hang Seng Conglomerates Consumer Goods Energy Financial Industries 
Ω n/a* 0.028 0.01 0.04 n/a* 0.005 
Α n/a* 0.0316 0.019 0.032 n/a* 0.036 
Β n/a* 0.938 0.967 0.941 n/a* 0.96 
α+β n/a* 0.9696 0.986 0.973 n/a* 0.996 
Days n/a* 22 49 25 n/a* 173 
Coefficients Info Tech Materials Prop. and Const Services Telecom. Utilities 
Ω n/a* 0.023 n/a* 0.089 0.505 0.032 
Α n/a* 0.042 n/a* 0.045 0.053 0.057 
Β n/a* 0.944 n/a* 0.9 0.908 0.885 
α+β n/a* 0.986 n/a* 0.945 0.961 0.942 
Days n/a* 49 n/a* 12 17 12 
*n/a – the results from the GARCH(1,1) were non stationary in variance. 
Table 3 shows the volatility analysis. The GARCH model did not capture the Hang 
Seng, Financial, Technology, Property and Construction sectors behaviour, since the 
results were non-stationary in variance. In spite of these restrictions, the remaining 
results clearly indicated that market volatility was short-lived for the services and 
utilities sector with a persistence of 12 days; the longest volatility persistence was 
registered by the industrial sector (up to 173 days). We also computed individual 
patterns of volatility and plotted them (see the Appendix). The results from the charts 
indicate clearly that the Hang Seng index was quite volatile during the week of the 
protests, followed by high uncertainty in the industrial, retail, telecommunications, 
utilities, financial, technology and services sectors. Overall, all the sectors were 
impacted upon, with significant movements over the period of the protests. 
Consequently, our results do align with the reviewed literature, as we found evidence 
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of significant connections between political instability and negative performance of the 
country’s stock market, as reflected by the study of the Hong Kong stock market. 
 
5. Critical Assessment of the Findings and Policy Implications 
The 2014 demonstrations in Hong Kong revealed the citizens’ dissatisfaction with 
China’s involvement and intervention in the territory’s democratic process, raising 
major concerns among the international community and its pool of investors in 
Greater China. There were some concerns that Hong Kong would be destabilised and 
that its position as a major financial centre would suffer as a result. However, and 
according to our analysis, the events that disturbed the territory and that unfolded over 
a few weeks seem to have been short-lived. The most prominent outcome is that Hong 
Kong’s stock market has not been destabilised by the demonstrations. The Hang Seng 
index has exhibited a strong performance during the first month of the year 2015; it 
has been gaining back in terms of confidence and it has been recovering the positions 
that it had lost during the times of unrest. However, Mainland China’s long-term plan 
to allow Shanghai to compete with Hong Kong and Singapore as a dominant financial 
market in the region denotes a cautious approach from the part of the Chinese 
authorities. Even though the Chinese authorities would deny that the creation and 
development of the financial centre in Shanghai has the objective to overtake Hong 
Kong’s privileged position as a major world financial centre in the region, it is clear 
that the boost of Shanghai will add rivalry in the region and that it will end up 
undermining Hong Kong’s position in the regional and global markets. This is to say 
that from a longer-term perspective, and in the eyes of the Chinese authorities, the 
Hong-Kong financial centre may not be seen as being very stable. 
 
6. Conclusions  
The Hong Kong protests towards the end of 2014 took place at a very delicate time for 
the territory’s economy since it was already struggling with slow economic growth 
spurred by the decrease in spending from Chinese visitors. The retail sector in Hong 
Kong suffered sharp declines during the second and third quarter of 2014, as China’s 
economic expansion was constrained by the country’s anticorruption campaign that 
reduced the number of visitors from mainland China ready to spend on jewellery and 
luxury items. As Hong-Kong was preparing to celebrate its National Day on the 1st of 
October, marking the beginning of its ’Golden Week‘ holiday and attracting many 
tourists from Mainland China, the protests created a general sense of uncertainty that 
discouraged visitors. They also impacted upon international investors’ sentiment and 
they brought to the fore the existing tensions between Hong Kong and Mainland China.  
Using a volatility framework based on the basic GARCH (1,1) model for the period Dec. 
2011 to Dec. 2014, our research confirms the importance of political stability to the 
investors community that are ready to shift their capital to more secure regions if they 
see their interests being threatened. What the analysis shows is that although the 
disturbances were short-lived, all sectors were impacted upon. With political unrest, 
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investors reassess their investment plans. The protests brought evidence that the 
privileged position that the territory had enjoyed over the years could easily be 
undermined, as these happened at a time when the mainland government was able to 
boost its own stock markets through adequate policies such as the large October 2008 
stimulus package. Pro-democracy clashes between protesters and police in the city’s 
central business area of Hong Kong did hold back Hong Kong’s equities, while 
Shanghai’s shares were boosted through the Chinese stimulus package. Consequently, 
it might be that, in a longer-term perspective, the 2014 Hong-Kong protests reinforced 
Beijing’s plan to allow Shanghai to become the major financial centre of China and of 
the region.  
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8. Appendix 
 
Hang Seng Index and its Sectors – Volatility Patterns 
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Figure 10                                                                                                                                Figure 11 
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Figure 14 
y 
i This category encompasses companies engaged in three or more businesses classified in 
different industries with each business contributing more than 10 per cent of the total turnover.  
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